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IN T~E SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * * *
MANAGEMENT SERVICES CORP.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,

v.

*
*
*

*

DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES, a
Utah corporation, and JOHN
and JANE DOES One through
Eight,
Defendants and
Appellants.

Case No. 16341

*
*

*
*

* * * * * * * *
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
IN OPPOSITION TO APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR REHEARING

* * * * * * * *

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was commenced by plaintiff-respondent,
MANAGEMENT SERVICES CORPORATION (hereinafter Management
Services), purchaser, against DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES, seller,
for the breach of a Uniform Real Estate Contract dated December
7, 1976 (hereinafter the Contract), wherein Development
Associates agreed to sell to Management Services eight (8)
improved lots in the Daybreak Phase III Subdivision for a total
price of $80,000, calculated at $10,000 per lot.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT AND SUPREME COURT
At the trial of this matter, the Honorable Peter F. Leary,
sitting without a jury, held that the Contract was divisible;
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that Management Services defaulted with respect to an
installment payment of $19,800 due on March 1, 1977, and
thereby forfeited its interest in two of the eight lots
specified in the Contract;

and that Development Associates

wrongfully terminated the Contract with respect to the
remaining six lots for payments which were not due until April
1,

May 1, and June 1, 1977.

Accordingly, on February 1, 1979,

the trial court entered judgment in favor of Management
Services on its third cause of action for damages for the
breach of contract by Development Associates and awarded
Management Services $7,700 in lost profits; $2,438 in lost
commissions; $600 for the wrongful retention of earnest money;
costs of $159.05; and attorneys' fees of $1,850, for a total
judgment of $12,747.05 with interest at the rate of eight
percent.

This Court, in its decision filed September 11, 1980,

affirmed the decision of the trial court and remanded the case
to the district court for its determination of reasonable
attorneys' fees to be granted to Management Services for
successfully prevailing on the appeal.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Management Services respectfully requests that this Court
deny the petition for rehearing of this matter sought by
Development Associates, and thereby affirm the earlier decision
of this Court upholding the judgment of the trial court and
remanding this case to the trial court for its determination of
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reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by Management Services in
prevailing on the appeal.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
Management Services does not controvert the assertions
contained in the Statement of Material Facts submitted by
Development Associates.

However, Management Services submits

that a complete understanding of the factual situation may not
be had without consideration of what follows.
The Uniform Real Estate Contract executed on December 7,
1976 by Development Associates and Management Services was
prepared by Development Associates (Record at 134, 288-89).
Language in that Contract bearing on the issue of severability
includes not only Paragraphs 2 and 3 quoted by Development
Associates, but also the following (R. 9):
6. It is understood that there presently exists an
obligation against said property in favor of State
Savings & Loan and Land Funding, Inc. with an unpaid
balance of $8,600.00 per lot, as of December 1, 1976.
While Mr. Edward A. White, representing Management Services
in the negotiations of the Contract, was familiar with real
estate transactions generally and with the specific contract
form used on this occasion, Development Associates was likewise
represented by a man of considerable experience in these real
estate matters and forms, Mr. Marvin J. Kirkham (R. 229).

Mr.

Kirkham graduated from college with a degree in business
management, attended one year of law school, worked for several
years as a real estate agent, and later as a broker, and had
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been involved in between three and four hundred transactions
involving Uniform Real Estate Contracts similar to the one here
at issue (R. 239-43).
The reason Management Services did not make the payment of
$19,800 due on March 1, 1977, was that it sought, as a
precondition to the payment, security from Development
Associates that certain improvements on the lots contracted
would be made (R. 13).

f~

While the time such improvements were

to be made has been disputed by the parties (R. 136, 231,
254-57), both parties clearly understood, as Mr. Kirkham of
Development Associates admitted at trial, that these
improvements were to be made on the lots at the expense of
Development Associates (R. 132-36, 228-32).

Moreover,

Management Services did offer to pay the overdue monies into
escrow (R. 13, 251).
Furthermore, both parties clearly understood that the lots
which Management Services had contracted to buy were to be
resold by Management Services to other parties (R. 127, 136-37,
256).
The consideration for the eight lots named in the Contract
was calculated on the basis of $10,000 per lot (R. 129).

The

figure of $800 paid as a deposit on the Contract was likewise
arrived at by calculating $100 per lot as Mr. Kirkham testified
at trial in response to a question of his own attorney (R.
265).

Separate warranty deeds were to be issued by Developmen:

Associates for each lot as it was paid for

(R. 266).
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The eight lots named in the Contract were each encumbered
by a mortgage debt of $6,600 in favor of State Savings & Loan

re

and by an obligation of approximately $2,000 in favor of Land
Funding, Inc., the party from which Development Associates was
purchasing the property (R. 66-68).

As Management Services

paid for each lot, Development Associates intended to transfer
money to State Savings & Loan and to Land Funding, Inc., to
satisfy the obligations owed those parties, and thereby to
procure a release from those parties of each lot on a
lot-by-lot basis.

(R. 268.)

After Development Associates retook possession of the eight
lots from Management Services, it began reselling them for its
own account.

The six lots later found by the trial court to

have been wrongfully forfeited by Development Associates were
resold to six different parties (R. 236-37).

ARGUMENT

I.
NO REASON JUSTIFYING A REHEARING BAS BEEN ALLEGED.
Many years ago, this Court settled the standards governing
the granting of a rehearing in Venard v. Old Hickory M. & S.
Company, 4 Utah 67, 7 P. 408, 409

(1885), as follows:

To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be made.
We must be convinced, either that the court failed to
duly consider some material point in the case, or that
it erred in its conclusions, or that some matter has
been discovered which was unknown at the time.

-5-
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The present petition for rehearing makes no allegation of
the discovery of new material.

Nor does the petition allege

that this Court failed to consider some material point in the
case.

That leaves, as the only available ground for granting

the rehearing, and the only one urged by Development
Associates, that this Court erred in its conclusions.

Where

only this ground is urged for granting the rehearing, this
Court has traditionally and justifiably been loath to comply.
People v. Rogerson, 4 Utah 231, 7 P. 411 (1885); In re
MacKnight, 4 Utah 237, 9 P. 299 (1886); Brown v. Pickard, 4
Utah 292, 11 P. 512 (1886);
P. 510 (1886).

Bacon v. Raybould, 4 Utah 357,

11

More recently, this Court took pains to

elaborate on the rational for this approach.

After noting that

an application for a rehearing is a matter of right not to be
discouraged in proper cases, it was said in Cummings v.
Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619, at 624 (1913) that:
When this court, however, has considered and decided
all of the material questions involved in a case, a
rehearing should not be applied for unless we have
misconstrued or overlooked some material fact or
facts, or have overlooked some statute or decision
which may affect the result, or that we have based the
decision on some wrong principle of law or have either
misapplied or overlooked something which materially
affects the result. In this case, nothing was done or
attempted by counsel, except to reargue the very
propositions we have fully considered and decided. If
we should write opinions on all the petitions for
rehearings filed, we should have to devote a very
large portion of our time in answering counsel's
contentions a second time; and if we should grant
rehearings because they are demanded, we should do
nothing else save to write and rewrite opinions in a
few cases. Let it again be said that it is conceded,
as a matter of course, that we cannot convince losing
counsel that their contention should not prevail, but
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided
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in making this concession let it also be remembered
that we, and not counsel, must ultimately assume all
responsibility with respect to whether our conclusions
are sound or unsound.
. . . As a general rule,
therefore, merely to reargue the grounds originally
presented can be of little, if any, aid to us.
Finding no merit in the petition presented in Cummings, the
petition was denied.

The same considerations govern the

instant petition for rehearing and it also should be denied.

II.
THIS COURT DID NOT ERR IN UPHOLDING
THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT
THE CONTRACT WAS AMBIGUOUS ON
THE ISSUE OF SEVERABILITY.
The brief in support of the petition for rehearing
challenges the finding that the Contract was ambiguous on the
issue of severability and therefore urges that it was error for
the trial court to admit parole evidence thereon.

The only

support for this assertion of error is a pair of quotations
from the dissenting opinion which undoubtedly were considered
by this Court in arriving at its prior decision upholding the
finding of the trial court that the Contract was ambiguous on
the severability issue.

Nothing new is offered by Development

Associates for its position.
With all due respect, the approach of the dissenting
opinion, which approach is adopted by Development Associates,
errs in that it focuses almost exclusively on the printed
provisions of the form contract which might be read to support
the argument against severability while ignoring the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology-7Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

typewritten language in the Contract which points in favor

of

severability.

See Record at 9-10.

This approach is faulty in

two respects.

In exalting printed over typewritten language,

it contravenes the holding of this Court that where a printed
form of contract is used, language supplied by the parties in
writing or otherwise is to take precedence over the printed
matter.
1977).

Bank of Ephraim v. Davis, 559 P.2d 538, 540 (Utah
Language supplied by the parties included the telling

piece stating (R. 9) :
Beginning March 1, 1977, buyer to complete payment on
two (2) lots ($19,800.00) and thereafter to close two
(2) lots on the first of each month. Total amount to
be paid on or before June 15, 1977.
Secondly, the dissent's approach trespasses against the
principle that an ambiguous document is to be "strictly
construed against him who draws it."
440, 354 P.2d 121, 123 (1960).

Maw v. Noble, 10 Utah 2d

The fact that a form contract

was used in the instant case does not militate otherwise where,
as here, the use of that form was suggested by Development
Associates which also prepared the contract by filling in the
blanks.
The dissenting opinion's construction of the printed
provisions of the Contract as requiring all lots to be taken or
none at all is not as inexorable as the dissenters appear to
view it.

First, the dissent assumes that it is contrary to

any

theory of severability for the buyer to take possession of all
eight lots specified in the Contract on the date of the
Contract's execution.

Management Services submits that when

read in the abstract, such a provision is quite neutral on the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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issue of severability.

When, however, it is realized that the

provision was apparently intended to allow Management Services
to bring prospective buyers on the lots to secure committments
for resale of those lots, the provision may be seen as tipping
the balance, if any direction, in favor of severability.
The dissent next argues that inasmuch as eight lots were
specified in the Contract of Sale, "it was not intended that
the buyer be permitted to accept certain lots and reject
others."

Dissenting Opinion at 9.

argument with no force.

This is a "straw man"

A contract is virtually never entered

into by any party, and certainly not here, with the intention
that it will be breached.

Indeed, the response of Management

Services to the notice of contract forfeiture served on it by
Development Associates indicated that Management Services fully
intended to pay for and take title to each of the lots named in
the Contract.

See Record at 13.

Management Services did not

foresee that its delayed action with respect to the March
payment while it sought security for the completion of the
improvements to the lots would be deemed a breach of the
Contract and a forfeiture of the right to two or any other
number of the eight lots.

However, as noted more fully in part

III of this brief, the intention to purchase each of the lots
offered for sale does not answer the only relevant question,
which is whether Development Associates would have been willing
to sell, and whether Management Services would have been
willing to buy, less than eight lots.

It is submitted that

both parties would have agreed to such a sale.
-9-

Moreover, the
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issue of severability typically arises only after, for whatever
reason, it is no longer possible for the whole original
Contract to be entirely satisfied.

What was

~ontracted

for is

not dispositive of what smaller quantity might instead have
been agreed upon.
The dissent's reliance on the printed remedial provisions
of the Uniform Real Estate Contract is also misplaced.
Paragraph 16(c) which allows the seller the right to sue for
the entire unpaid balance of the contract when the buyer fails
to make a payment within a specified period after the due date,
provides a harsh remedy to the seller to compensate him for the
risk he bears in selling his property on time and for
installments instead of for a lump sum cash payment up front.
As such, it was almost surely drafted with a single parcel in
mind to be paid for in several installments.

To infer from

this printed provision that the Contract is not severable,
where the form was used instead for the sale of eight distinct
lots to be closed separately upon the payment of a single sum
for each lot, is clearly inappropriate.

For the same reasons,

recourse to the repossession option provided in Paragraph 16(a)
is also neutral on the issue of severability under the
circumstances.
Finally, the willingness of Development Associates to allow
Management Services to choose the two lots to which it takes
title in any given month, which procedure is the best suited
method of securing the resale of these lots, is entirely
consonant with the majority's holding that the lots were
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
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considered "fungible" and undercuts the argument of the
dissenting opinion that this contractual arrangement requires
as a matter of law that the contract be interpreted as entire.
Accordingly, as the Contract was ambiguous on its face as
to whether the parties intended that the sale of each lot, or
each pair of lots, was severable, this Court properly upheld
the action of the district court in considering extraneous
evidence of the parties' intentions in this matter.

III.
THIS COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING
THAT THE DISTRICT COURT HAD A RATIONAL BASIS
FOR CONCLUDING THAT THE CONTRACT WAS
INTENDED TO BE SEVERABLE AND NOT ENTIRE.
Development Associates asserts that there was no rational
basis for the district court's conclusion that the Contract was
severable (1) because allegedly no evidence was introduced on
the issue of severability at the trial of this action, and (2)
because "Management Services intended to and did in fact enter
into a contract to purchase eight lots in the Daybreak Phase
III Subdivision."

Brief of Development Associates in Support

of Petition for Rehearing at 7.

Management Services submits

that evidence bearing on the issue of severability was
introduced at the trial of this matter.

To quote the majority

opinion at page 3:
The testimony at trial showed that plaintiff is a
corporation organized for the purpose of buying and
-11-
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selling property, and that its president, Edward A.
White, is a real estate broker. Plaintiff was
purchasing the lots for resale . .
See Record at 125, 127, 136-37, 256.

These facts bear on the

severability issue because they indicate Development Associates
entered into this transaction with Management Services merely
as a way of quickly and efficiently marketing these individual
lots.

At the time the Contract was made, it was not known

which lots would sell first or which would bring the highest
eventual price.

Obviously, Development Associates was simply

interested in unloading as many of these properties as would
taken by the first buyer to offer a fair price.

~

Management

Services, as to the eight lots contracted for, was this buyer.
Had Management Services only been willing to buy six lots
initially, Development Associates would have had no objection
to such a sale, for it later sold the six lots still in issue
to six different buyers.

From these facts, it is evident that

Development Associates had no apparent reason to demand that
the eight lots be sold as a single unit or not at all.

As this

criterion is the determining factor of whether the Contract was
severable under the test of divisibility properly established
by the majority opinion of this court, the district court's
opinion, and that of this Court affirming it, should stand.
Corning to the second point of Development Associates, no
answer to the severability question is provided by asserting
that Management Services intended to purchase all eight lots
offered by Development Associates and specified in the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Contract.

As Management Services was confident it could resell

each of the eight lots offered at a profit, it naturally agreed
to purchase that many.

But there was nothing magic in the

number or location of these eight lots.

Indeed, Development

Associates has articulated no reason why it might have desired
to sell all eight lots only as a single group.
only offered strained arguments based on the

It has instead
bare language of

the Contract and later documents.
What the test of severability requires, as has been shown,
is a determination of "whether the purpose of the parties was
to buy and sell the whole tract as a unit so that the parties
would not have agreed on less than the whole, in which case the
contract is entire; otherwise, it is severable."
Opinion at 2.

Majority

Just because the parties intended to and did

enter into a contract for the sale of eight lots does not mean
that the parties would have refused to make a contract for any
smaller number of lots.

As the interest of Development

Associates was only that of recovering its investment in these
properties with a fair profit at the soonest point possible, it
is quite clear it would have been willing to sell any number of
lots Management Services was willing to buy.

This conclusion

is substantiated by the fact that Development Associates later
sold the six lots as to which Management Services had not
forfeited its interest to six different parties.
Thus it appears that the record and the inferences fairly
drawn therefrom more than adequately support the trial court's
decision that the parties intended the Contract to be severable.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for-13digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons given above, the majority of this Court
properly affirmed the holding of the district court in this
matter that the Contract was severable and that Development
Associates wrongfully terminated the Contract as to the six
lots for which payment was not due until April, May, and June
of 1977.

The award of damages to Management Services which

suffered by this breach was proper.

As no legitimate ground

for reconsidering the prior decision of this Court in this
matter has been presented, the petition for rehearing should

~

denied and this action should be remanded to the district court·
for a determination of the attorneys' fees to be awarded to
Management Services for the effort expended in prevailing on
the prior appeal and with respect to this petition for
rehearing, pursuant to the earlier decision of this Court.

Respectfully submitted,
SENIOR & SENIOR

By,~~~··
Kent B. Scott
By:
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John.,K. Mangum
Attorneys for Management Services,
Plaintiff and Respondent.
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